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ABSTRACT 
JAPANESE TROJAN PONIES: 
LESSONS FOR TBE EUROPEAN AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY FROM THE UNITED STATES 
This paper reviews the three strategic stages of 
Japanese automobile manufacturers' strategy within the 
United States, and, from this, forecasts likely developments 
within a European context. It considers the implications of 
future Japanese initiatives from three perspectives - that 
of the European automobile competitors, of national 
Governments, and of the wider E.E.C. federation. 
JAPANESE TROJAN PONIES: 
LESSONS FOR TBE EUROPEAN AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY FROM TBE UNITED STATES 
One of the most important development in the globalisation 
of world trade in the last 15 years has been the expansion 
of the Japanese into North American and European markets. 
Within this, the growth of the Japanese in the automobile 
industry has been amongst the most dramatic. In 1970 Japan 
produced 3 million cars with less than 700,000 exported: by 
1985, production in Japan had grown to over 7.5 million with 
4.5 million units exported. This growth has impacted 
powerfully upon world trade, with imports of Japanese cars, 
trucks, and components accounting for over half of the 
current $ 40 b. U.S. trade deficit with Japan. 
We believe that Japanese strategy in the U.S. provides a 
significant condition of "deja vu" for Europe. This article 
therefore analyses the stages of Japanese implantation in 
North America and forecasts likely developments in Europe 
based on the U.S. model. Finally the implications of the 
Japanese moves for the European automobile industry, 
national Governments, and the E.E.C. will be evaluated. 
THE JAPANESE IN NORTH AMERICA 
The Japanese penetration of the North American car market 
has passed through three clear phases. 
Phase I: Exports from a Japanese Base. (<1980) 
The first stage of Japanese strategic implemention has been 
to export directly - Japanese sales in the U.S. remained 
below 5% of the market until the early 1970's. From then 
on, the rapid changes in market structure resulting from the 
oil crisis and the consumer demand for smaller cars, 
resulted in a marked increase in Japanese market share - up 
to 20% by 1980. The protectionist protests from the U.S. 
automobile industry led to the institution of the Voluntary 
Restraint Agreement (VRA) in 1981 which imposed limits on 
imports for a three year period. 
Phase II : Stepping Stones. (1980 - 1985) 
This resultant constraint of VRA caused a Japanese re- 
evaluation of the basic economics of automobile production. 
Given that the U.S. automotive union environment and 
supplier industry stn+ure were unfamiliar and more costly 
per unit than in Japan, low volume manufacture in the U.S.A. 
appeared an unattractive option but inevitable to avoid more 
extreme protectionist measures. Honda took the first step 
in 1985 with a small assembly plant in Ohio, followed by 
Nissan's truck assembly plant in Tennessee. 
The big three U.S. automobile manufacturers were also forced 
to reassess their strategy. In the previous decade all 
three had taken minority equity positions in Japanese car 
companies although their much smaller partners were not 
considered to be particularly threatening. Increasingly 
however, the U.S. companies looked towards their Japanese 
partners for low cost components and began to @lbadgell 
Japanese small cars for the U.S. market. At the same time, 
U.S. manufacturers began llcrashl@ internal programmes in an 
attempt to produce small cars at Japanese cost levels (GM 
Saturn; Ford Alpha; Chrysler Liberty). 
In order to effect technological transfer of the Japanese 
manufacturing process, joint ventures were established to 
produce small cars in the U.S.A. The first of these was 
that of General Motors and Toyota, which was not linked 
financially, rapidly followed by Ford and Chrysler with 
their equity partners, Mazda and Mitsubishi. 
The joint venture partners had very different objectives. 
The Japanese saw a low risk, low investment "stepping stone!' 
into the protected and unfamiliar U.S. market: the 
occidental companies saw a "stepping stone" to catching up 
with Japanese manufacturing technology to be applied later 
to their own internal programmes. Neither partner had a 
long term commitment to continue. 
Phase III : Implantation (1985 - ) 
Albeit with different time-frames, from the perspective of 
both nations the joint ventures' should be viewed as 
successful. For the U.S., Japanese management methods have 
created unprecedented labour flexibility and low manning 
levels. For Japan, experience has been gained rapidly with 
concomitant confidence in Japanese ability to compete from 
a North American base. As protectionist pressures 
continued, together with calls for a strengthening of the 
Yen, Japanese companies established additional joint 
ventures and wholly-owned facilities despite the American 
government's lifting of VRA in 1984. 
During 1985 plans were announced for ten additional plants 
in the U.S.A. as well as in Canada and Mexico, two countries 
which possessed preferred import status with the U.S.A. The 
capacities of the original facilities have also been 
considerably increased, and cars added to Nissan truck 
plant. By 1988 new Japanese capacity for over 2 million 
cars will be in place to supply a market of around 10 
million cars. 
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The chronological sequence of the implementation of Japanese 
automobile strategy is seen in Table 1 below. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
THE JAPANESE IN EUROPE 
A study of the development of the Japanese automobile 
implantation in Europe shows close parallels with U.S. 
history as far as phase I and II. 
Until 1985 Japanese attention focussed mainly upon the U.S. 
for two reasons. Firstly, because of its great homogeneity, 
and secondly, because the sudden swing in demand by the 
American consumer towards small automobiles.found a gap in 
the U.S. manufacturers product lines which could be filled 
immediately by existing Japanese products. In Europe the 
oil price change did not modify the market structure so 
radically, given that European manufacturers were already 
producing small automobiles. 
Japanese imports into Europe have also been limited by 
various quotas and restraints for many years. In the U.K., 
a ftgentlemenfs agreement @@ exists to limit market share.to 
10012%: in France and Italy, quotas limit imports to 2-3%. 
Germany, the largest market, has no import restrictions but, 
until 1985, Japanese market share was less than 10%. The 
result has been a slow growth in Japanese share of the total 
European market to 11% in 1985. 
Reacting to protectionism, the Japanese have followed the 
same pattern of "stepping stones" joint ventures with low 
capacities and investment. The Nissan move in Italy and 
Spain, and the Honda link with Austin Rover follow this 
pattern. The Phase I Nissan project in the U.K. to produce 
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24,000 automobiles a year fell far below an economic level 
thus replicating the U.S. entry strategy. 
Table 2 shows a comparison of developments in the two 
continents, North America being in Phase III of Japanese 
implantation at the beginning of 1986, whereas Europe was 
still in Phase II. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
1986 - TOWARDS PHASE III IN EUROPE? 
The rapid strengthening of the Yen against the dollar in 
1985, up by 40%, radically changed global economics and 
triggered the start.of Japanese investment in Europe 
parallel to that of Phase III in the U.S. The economics of 
exporting automobiles from Japan as opposed to manufacture 
in North America or Europe have totally changed, favouring 
increased sourcing from those plants already in operation. 
In addition, aggressive new competition to the Japanese 
emanates from both Korea and Taiwan, the currencies of which 
have not appreciated against the U.S. dollar.- : 
The profits of the Japanese automobile manufacturers have 
therefore showed a sharp decline for the first time in ten 
years. To date, their strategy has been to maintain market 
share and volume by absorbing a large part of the currency 
appreciation in pricing, at the expense of profitability. 
However, with manufacturing capacity coming on stream in 
North America, Japanese attention has moved to Europe where 
the Yen has not appreciated so strongly. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Evidence of this shift in strategic focus is demonstrated by 
Japanese export volumes to Europe jumping by 50% in the 
first half of 1986, relative to that of the previous year. 
The growth has been most marked in Germany where the 
Japanese share had been only lo-11% despite the lack of 
import restrictions. During 1986, the Japanese share rose 
rapidly to be over 15%. 
Defensive Reactions: 
The four major markets of Europe - Germany, France, Italy 
and the U.K. - account for 73% of the total European market, 
Germany being the largest at 25%. With Spanish and Dutch 
market shares approximating 5%, six countries account for 
over 80% of cars sold in Europe. 
Italy, France and Spain impose strict quotas on Japanese 
automobile imports. The Netherlands has a small state-owned 
speciality automobile manufacturer, Volvo Car, but is so far 
maintaining an open door to imports. The U.K. continue to 
maintain a 11% quota on Japanese imports with a clear policy 
of encouraging-Honda and Nissan to substitute automobiles 
built in the U.K. 
Major lobbying is to be observed with growing clamour from 
the German car manufacturers, hurt both by declining exports 
to the U.S. in addition to the increase of Japanse market 
share of their domestic market. In September 1986 the 
President of Audi, Dr Habbel, expressed concern about the 
increased penetration by Japanese producers in the West 
Germany new car market. He noted that in 1981 the Japanese 
promised to freeze their penetration of the German market at 
10%. The President of BMW, Mr Ebarhard von Keunheim, has 
also warned that "the Japanese importation level is close to 
crossing the threshold of pain". He insists that the German 
motor industry would prefer that no protectionist meaures be 
imposed because, like the Japanese industry, it exports more 
than half of its total output and stands to lose more than 
any other country should a trade war break out. (German 
1985 automobile exports were worth $28 bn. versus imports of 
$6 bn). 
In October 1986, the President of the German Manufacturers 
Association, the VDA, Hans-Erdnamm Schonbeck, said it was 
unacceptable that cars should pour into Germany from Japan, 
because countries such as Italy, France, Britain, the U.S. 
and Canada had placed restrictions on Japanese automobile 
imports. Mr Schonbeck said, "1 hope the Japanese will see 
sense. Industry in Germany has not gone to the Bonn 
Government for help and has no plans to do so, but we hope 
that the present share (of Japanese automobiles in the 
German market) will not rise anymore". In counterpoint, the 
West German Minister of Transport, Werner Dollinger, 
rejected all protectionist action, saying that the West 
German market would always stay open to the importation of 
automobiles. Any change in this German position would 
obviously alter fundamentally the official E.E.C. position. 
In November 1986, senior E.E.C. officials privately met 
representatives of the CCMC, the automobile makers lobby 
group, to discuss a report calling for new and firm 
initiative to limit the growing penetration of the European 
automobile and light commercial vehicle market from low-cost 
Japanese manufacturers, by quotas or other protectionist 
actions. Further, a substantial report was presented to the 
European Parliament on E.E.C. - Japanese trade relations, 
drafted by Mr James Moorehouse, the British Tory MEP, 
calling for import tariffs to cut the trade deficit. 
Japanese Response: 
The Japanese manufacturers have strongly denied any shift 
from America to Europe, but MIT1 cautioned the industry of 
the fast rising level of E.E.C. exports, asking for 
voluntary restraint in order to head off trade friction 
between the E.E.C. and Japan and setting a ffguidelineff of a 
10% unit increase over 1985. The Japanese manufacturers 
constrained shipments over the next few months, but in 
October 1986, cumulative sales were still 22% above 1985. At 
the same time, Nissan announced that it would advance the 
second stage of its manufacturing investment in the U.K., a 
move quickly followed by Japanese competitors as evidenced 
by recent statements from Toyota which also indicate a re- 
evaluation of their manufacturing plans in Europe. 
These pressures suggest that the Japanese are now moving to 
Phase III in Europe - direct investment in manufacturing 
plants. The parallel with the 1984 Japanese strategy in the 
U.S. seems manifest. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
IMPLICATIONS 
The potential addition of new, highly efficient factories in 
an industry already suffering from fierce competition and 
and a 20% over-capacity, has radical implications for 
automobile manufacturers, European governments, and the 
E.E.C. 
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Implications for European Automobile Manufacturers: 
In the current environment of slow market growth, over- 
capacity, and high exit barriers, the European automobile 
companies will clearly lobby strongly to set limits on the 
imports of Japanese automobiles and to avoid additional NEW 
capacity being established in Europe. The takeover of some 
existing excess European capacity by a Japanese Company as 
has happened in the U.S., would be likely to be more 
palatable. 
Whereas attention has focussed mainly upon finished 
automobile construction, component manufacture.also faces a 
substantial threat. The U.S. multi-nationals already 
incorporate Japanese components into the cars they build in 
Europe and include the production in Europe of cars designed 
by their Japanese partners amongst their strategic options. 
This type of penetration is hidden and inexorable, placing 
companies without Japanese partners at a potential 
disadvantage. The European component industry will quickly 
face the same pressures as have occurred in the U.S. 
Implications for European Governments.and the E.E.C. 
1. Employment. 
In recent years the automobile industry has joined 
the four traditional problem industries - coal, 
steel, textiles, and shipbuilding - as a European 
government pre-occupation. Its importance is related 
to the 1.3 million people directly employed in the 
manufacture of automobiles in Europe, with probably 
twice that number in the related component 
industries. 
The automobile industry and government are closely 
intertwined, with several European governments being 
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2. 
direct shareholders.in automobile companies - 
Renault, Austin Rover, Alfa Romeo, Volvo Car, and 
SEAT. Volkswagen is 20% owned by the German 
Government - currently being denationalised - and 20% 
by the State of Lower Saxony. 
The nationalised automobile companies have also been 
amongst the biggest loss-makers. Companies such as 
Renault have delayed manpower reductions long after 
their private sector competitors such as Peugeot, 
because of government pressure. In many cases the 
Governments have continued to pour money into the 
ailing companies, whilst waiting for an acceptable 
suitor to take the problem off their hands. 
Finance. 
Government finance is an additional critical factor 
in both private and publicly owned car company 
investment decisions. A new car component or 
assembly plant provides the prospect of substantial 
job creation and investment between $500 - 1,OOOM. 
To attract this investment, regional and national 
governments have provided such a wide range of soft 
loans, development grants, subsidies for training, 
accelerated depreciation, and facilities, that no 
project is planned without evaluating them. European 
countries have competed aggressively with each other 
for projects. Even Daimler Benz, the most profitable 
of the European companies, made a decision on the 
location of a new plant based on subsidies estimated 
at $70 million from the German state of Baden - 
Wurtemberg. 
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3. Location - the National/Multi-National Issue. 
The existing European automobile manufacturers can be 
dichotomised in terms of freedom of action, and 
choice in planning the location of new investment: 
. The %ationalff car companies - for example, 
Renault, Peugeot, FIAT, VW, Austin Rover, who have 
commitments to their home country governments and 
economies. 
. The existing ffmulti-nationalsff - Ford and General 
Motors, who manufacture and cross-source 
automobiles and components between European 
countries and North America, South America and the 
Far East. For these companies, choices of sites 
and other worldwide locations, are made mainly on 
economic grounds. 
The two U.S. multinationals - Ford and G.M. - have 
been able to take their pick of competitive bids from 
many European countries when they have planned new 
investments. When Ford considered a new plant in 
1979, not only Spain, but Belgium, U.K., France, 
Germany and Austria competed vigorously with grants, 
subsidies and soft loans for the investment, with up 
to one-third of the initial investment of $500 
million being offered in some form of asssistance. 
The package offered by the French Government was 
fiercely protested by Renault and Peugeot. 
In 1985 the U.K. Trade and Industry Secretary, Norman 
Tebbit, sought assurances from the German Government 
that Ford was not being given unfair advantages to 
sway their choice of location of a new $200M engine 
plant between Dagenham and Cologne. The plant was 
eventually set up in the U.K. 
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G.M.'s $1.5 billion investments in new car and 
components plants in Spain, and in a $500 million 
engine and transmission plant in Austria have also 
been one-third subsidised by government and regional 
assistance. 
In competing for investment, governments have 
generally been concerned with short-term employment 
or job creation issues many of which may have 
negative long term effects upon the competitiveness 
of their own domestic automobile manufacturers. 
The Japanese companies, particularly Nissan, Toyota 
and Honda, are rapidly changing from %ationalff to 
ffmulti-nationalff companies in terms of investment 
strategies, learning the art of maximising government 
grants, both in the U.S. and Europe, by ffplaying.offff 
one government against another. 
The links of various Japanese companies with the U.S. 
car companies further complicates the situation with 
both Ford and G.M. assembling Japanese commercial 
vehicles in Europe and using Japanese components. 
EUROPEAN DILEMMAS . 
European governments are clearly undecided as to whether the 
Japanese are merely new players in the existing game, or 
whether their entry fundamentally changes the rules. In 
addition to trying to decide how to deal with the increasing 
volumes of direct automobile imports which are an important 
component of the E.E.C. trade deficit with Japan, Europe is 
faced increasingly with two inter-related problems: 
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. Whether to take a nationalistic or community 
approach to attracting Japanese manufacturing 
investment and joint ventures. 
. How to treat the %ransplantsff - Japanese 
automobiles assembled in another E.E.C. country, 
but using components imported from Japan. 
Direct Investment and Joint-Ventures: 
To date, direct investment by the Japanese in automobile 
manufacture has-been small. As an example, Nissan has been 
the most adventurous investing f50M in the first stage of 
its U.K. plant and creating 470 jobs. The second stage will 
cost f330M. (f100M from the U.K. government) and employ an 
additional 2,200 people. Nissan has also taken an increased 
shareholding in the Spanish truck company - Motor Iberica. 
Nissan's Italian initiative with Alfa-Romeo appeared doomed 
from the start by the Italian governments adoption of an 
ethnocentric stance, and by limiting production to 60,000 
units a year. 
In the U.K. the British Government has adopted a more 
positive approach by encouraging Honda -.Rover co-operation 
and would probably welcome a direct Japanese shareholding in 
return for increased levels of employment. Mrs Thatcher has 
also directly solicited and encouraged the Nissan 
investment, although these policies are in many ways 
inconsistent with the rejection of the Ford bid for Austin 
Rover, and the General Motors bid for Leyland Trucks. 
Both U.S. and European automobile manufacturers have claimed 
that the incentives offered to Japanese manufacturers place 
the newcomers at an advantage to existing operations. The 
Japanese have also been able to negotiate union agreements 
which are better in terms of wage contracts and job . 
flexibility than traditional practice. Finally, in setting 
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up green-field operations, a younger work force has been 
hired, with a lesser pension burden upon the company. 
Ironically, it should be noted that all claims are equally 
valid for new Ford and G.M. investments in other countries! 
True additional long term job creation is also highly 
debatable in an industry demonstrating over-capacity, since 
each generation of investment is claimed to employ fewer 
people. Ford state that for every job created by Nissan in 
the U.K., two will be lost at other U.K. car-making 
facilities since Japanese plants generally have manning 
levels at 50% of their U.S. or European equivalents. 
At the European Community level, Mr Willy de Clercq, the 
European Commissioner responsible for External Trade has 
warned E.E.C. member against using "beggar-my-neighbour" 
competitive State subsidies to attract Japanese' investment. 
The European Parliament has requested the Commission to draw 
up common guide-lines for all member States on the value- 
added, local content, and use of State aids relating to 
Japanese investments in the Community. The Commission's 
belief is that the huge deficit in trade between the 
Community and.Japan should be tackled not by imposing limits 
on Japanese exports to the Community, but by increasing 
European exports to Japan. 
Transplants. 
European governments are also divided on how to handle 
Vransplants" - Japanese operations setting up in Europe. 
Most of the debate centres on the proportion of local 
content, 80% being considered politically acceptable. 
Indeed, Mrs Thatcher has spoken proudly of the 80% local 
content level planned for the second stage Nissan project. 
However, the calculation of local content generally includes 
not only assembly and all associated overheads, but also 
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marketing and other administrative expenses. It is 
therefore fairly easy to reach 70080% V1local contentI whilst 
still importing the high technology components'such as 
engines, transmissions and electronics - the high value- 
added items. 
In response, Ford has mounted a campaign to have local 
content measured on ex-factory cost, rather than price. 
Others have proposed that the percentage be measured by 
weight, thus encompassing engine and transmissions units. 
Once again, the parallel of the U.S. is apposite. When the 
Japanese have set up operations in the U.S.A. the first 
components sourced locally were bulky and lower technology 
items such a seats, trim rubber, and glass. -There existed a 
clear strategy to retain high value-added core components, 
involving advanced manufacturing technologies in Japan and 
concern arose in the U.S. that this trend was harmful to 
that country@s long term technological base. (Reich 
& Mankin, "Joint Ventures with Japan give away our future'*. 
HBR, March 1986). It could be argued that the U.S. 
automobile industry may be losing fundamental design and 
manufacturing skills, which may not be possible to recover. 
Not surprisingly, the first joint ventures set up in the 
U.K. as part of the Nissan project have involved seats, 
exhaust pipes, and interior trim! Austin Rover fought long 
and hard with the U.K. Government to retain engine design 
and manufacture for future Honda-Rover projects. This may 
be less effective from a unit cost viewpoint, but once 
engineering groups are disbanded, technology can be lost for 
ever. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Japanese implantation in North America has passed through 
three phases, triggered by increasingly protectionist 
lobbying by the domestic automobile manufacturers. Europe 
has not yet reached Phase III, but the changed Yen/$ 
exchange rate has resulted in a sudden increase in Japanese 
imports and increasing pressure for protectionism, 
particularly from the German industry. 
The Japanese are reacting as they did in North America, with 
direct investment in manufacturing facilities. The European 
car companies will lobby against this because of the current 
over-capacity situation and vote for protectionism. 
European governments are highly concerned because of 
employment implications. However, protectionist mechanisms 
such as guotas, tariffs and subsidies have been shown to be 
expensive ways of saving jobs in industries such as steel, 
coal and textiles. 
The European governments are already competing with each 
other over the two U.S. multinations - Ford and G.M. The 
Japanese will operate in the same way as they move into 
Europe. Is competitive bidding of subsidies the most 
efficient way of allocating resources, or should the E.E.C. 
co-ordinate activity? Recent history of inter-European co- 
operation makes this unlikely. 
As the Japanese move to direct manufacturing investment they 
will tend to manufacture locally the lower technology 
components, and continue to import directly high value-added 
components such as engines, transmissions and electronics. 
Control of this by "local contentI' mechanisms is difficult 
and ineffective. 
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European automobile manufacturers and governments should 
strive for technology transfer, using joint ventures, 
license agreements or other incentives in order to learn 
from the U.S. parallel. They should remember the lessons 
from historical precedent. From more than two thousand 
years ago came the caveat "beware the Greeks bearing gifts" 
- the example of' the Trojan Horse being particularly 
apposite today. In 1986, the Japanese presence in Europe 
has reached the size of a rTrojan pony": the time has come 
to return the gift with firmness and diplomacy 
19 
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TABLE 1 
JAPANESE IMPLANTATION IN TBE AUTO INDUSTRY 
Phase 1: Cl980 
Exports Rapid increase in Japanese import share 
Protectionism 
Quotas, Japanese Woluntary restraint" 
Phase II: 1980-85 
"The Stepping 
Stones" First small Japanese manufacturing 
plants and "stepping stone" joint 
ventures. 
Additional manufacturing and joint 
ventures in neighbouring countries with 
preferred status to get around quotas. 
Phase III: 1985 
Local 
Manufacture Greatly increased independent Japanese 
investment as confidence grows. Initial 
low capacities increased. 
Japanese component suppliers follow. 
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JAPANESE IMPLANTATION IN NORTH AMERICA & EUROPE UP TO 1986 
Phase U.S.A. Europe 
I : Exports from a Japanese Base 
Rapid increase in 
Japanese import share 
Japanese share of 
U.S. market: 
10% : 1977 
20% : 1980 
Protectionism, 
quotas, 
“voluntary restraint” 
VRA : 1981-84 
“restraint” 1985-86 
Japanese share of 
total European 
market: 
10% : 1983 
15% : 1987(estimate) 
20% : 1989(estimate) 
Quotas in France, 
Italy 
“VRA” in U.K. 
II : The Stepping Stones 
First small Japanese 
manufacturing 
projects and j.v. 
Honda Marysville: 
1983 
Nissan Smyrna: 
1983 (trucks) 
GM-Toyota NUMMI: 
1984 
Toyota Fremont: 
1984 
Mitsubishi-Chrysler: 
1984 
Japanese manufacturing 
& j.v. in neighbouring 
countries with 
preferred import 
status to 
circumnavigate quotas 
Ford-Mazda-Mexico: 
1984 
Honda, Canada: 1985 
Toyota, Canada: 1985 
Hyundai, Canada: 1985 
Kia, Canada: 1985 
Nissan - Alfa Romeo 
1980 
AR - Honda : 
: Ballade 1979 
: xx 1981 
:yY 1985 
Nissan U.K. Phase I: 
1984 
Nissan-Motor Iberica 
1980 
Toyota - Portugal 
Suzuki - Spain 
- Eire 1986 
